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ABSTRACT
he proliferation of terrorist generated content online is a cause for con-
cern as it goes together with the rise of radicalisation and violent extrem-
ism. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) need powerful platforms to help 
stem the inluence of such content. his article showcases the TENSOR 
project which focusses on the early detection of online terrorist activi-
ties, radicalisation and recruitment. Operating under the H2020 Secure 
Societies Challenge, TENSOR aims to develop a terrorism intelligence 
platform for increasing the ability of LEAs to identify, gather and analyse 
terrorism-related online content. he mechanisms to tackle this chal-
lenge by bringing together LEAs, industry, research, and legal experts 
are presented.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For most citizens, the Internet is a valuable resource in day-to-day life, 
but for criminals and terrorists, it provides opportunities to exploit the 
Web as a tool where they can communicate with ailiates, coordinate 
action plans, raise funds and introduce new supporters or recruits into 
their networks. hese activities present a signiicant risk to the citizens 
of Europe.
TENSOR is an EU project funded under the Secure Societies pillar of the 
Horizon 2020 programme and aims to develop a platform ofering Law 
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) fast and reliable planning and prevention 
functionalities for the early detection of terrorist activities, radicalisation 
and recruitment. he project aims to develop solutions to mitigate this 
risk from terrorism and prevent future attacks or crimes from occurring 
by analysing potential terrorism-related content resulting from extrem-
ists’ open communications and activity patterns online. To this end, a 
uniied platform will be developed, which will allow for multidimen-
sional content integration from heterogeneous online resources, with a 
view to gathering large amounts of Surface, Deep, and Dark Web con-
tent, applying automatic analysis and summarisation, and presenting the 
collected intelligence through intuitive interactive interfaces.
Informed by the requirements of LEAs and the challenges they face, the 
TENSOR platform will include beyond state-of-the-art techniques for 
searching, crawling, monitoring and gathering multimodal and mul-
tilingual Web content with the aim of expanding LEAs current reach 
and information sources. he techniques developed in TENSOR aim 
to improve eiciency, performance and efectiveness in inding and 
gathering this content. Once the TENSOR platform has successfully 
acquired content, information extraction techniques will be employed 
such as entity-extraction, image, video and audio recognition, as well as 
automatic translation. his will allow for the content to be categorised 
against a custom-developed taxonomy for terrorist-generated content. 
Categorisation will provide the basis for the TENSOR platform to per-
form an automated analysis of the content, employing techniques such 
as clustering and classiication, social network analytics and semantic 
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reasoning. Ater the automated analysis has been performed, the plat-
form will automatically select the most relevant content and generate 
summaries and visualisations to be displayed to the end-user LEAs. 
his is expected to signiicantly reduce “information overload” on 
LEAs and contribute to an increase in eiciency and performance in 
analysing terrorist-generated content online. To this end, most pro-
cesses are automated in TENSOR, however end-users will have the 
option of reviewing these processes and re-coniguring the system, 
making sure that the outputs it with what is required, should there 
be a need to do so. Moreover, EU data protection regulations will be 
taken into account during the design and development of the system. 
Measures will be taken to ensure that the principles of a) data mini-
misation, b) data quality, c) data limitation, d) data protection, e) data 
portability, and f) data breach notiications are built into the system.
By delivering these capabilities, it is expected that TENSOR will posi-
tively impact upon: a) more eicient and efective prevention of ter-
rorist activities organised and planned online; b) faster detection of 
novel terrorism and radicalisation trends, terrorist-published content 
and grassroots terrorist cells; c) reduction of “information overload” 
on LEAs, by automatically summarising and visualising only the rel-
evant content; d) built-in privacy and data protection; e) industry’s 
understanding of LEA requirements, and therefore a positive impact 
on the development of future products and Europe’s overall industry 
competitiveness.
his article showcases the TENSOR project by presenting the chal-
lenges LEAs face and the methodology applied in TENSOR for extract-
ing their requirements (Section 2), the tools and technologies currently 
being developed as part of the integrated TENSOR platform which aim 
to advance the state-of-the-art in acquiring, analysing, summarising 
and visualising terrorism-related Web content (Section 3), a legal and 
ethical assessment of the current operational environment in several 
European countries (Section 4), and the impact TENSOR may have on 
this domain (Section 5), before concluding (Section 6).
39
TENSOR: Retrieval and analysis of heterogeneous online content ... AKHGAR et al.
2. TENSOR USE CASES: CHALLENGES, 
METHODOLOGY, AND USER REQUIREMENTS
TENSOR employs an agile user-centred methodology to inform the 
development of the platform. his includes close consultation with a 
number of LEAs and security organisations (such as the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (UK), Mossos d’Esquadra (Catalonia), National Crime 
Agency (UK), West Yorkshire Police (UK), Belgian Federal Police, as 
well as organisations from Greece and Germany) to develop a compre-
hensive set of requirements for the platform. 
hese user requirements were created based on speciic use case scenar-
ios in four areas pertinent to terrorism: domestic terrorism, international 
terrorism, lone actor terrorism and radicalisation, and are based on real 
life events encountered by the LEA partners in the project. hrough 
these scenarios, it was possible to extract and analyse the challenges of 
LEAs and deine the capabilities needed to efectively overcome these 
challenges. he user requirements were subsequently distilled from the 
scenarios in the form of Agile User Stories and were gathered irst at a 
high and then at a detailed level. Analysing each high-level requirement 
into a subset of lower level requirements led to the identiication of cor-
responding functional and non-functional requirements. 
Next, we irst describe the challenges faced by LEAs while ight-
ing terrorism on the World Wide Web and then depict the use cases/
user-requirements.
2.1 CHALLENGES
hrough the four use cases and preliminary requirements gathering, 
the project was able to recognise a number of key challenges that are 
particularly signiicant in the terrorism domain and that the TENSOR 
platform would need to tackle in order to provide functionality beyond 
that the LEAs already have access to. his section describes those chal-
lenges in the context of what information would be required and how 
such information may currently be used by terrorists; this is classiied 
into the following major categories:
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• Utilising the Surface, Deep, and Dark Web as tools for coor-
dinating, recruiting, training and planning of terrorist acts: 
Terrorist groups (and their supporters) use the Web to recruit and 
train new members, and organise coordinated attacks. Especially 
the Deep and Dark Web can provide, due to their anonymous and 
encrypted structure, a safe environment for coordinating and plan-
ning attacks, minimising the chances of detection and arrest. hey 
are also used for training and radicalisation by facilitating the shar-
ing and dissemination of information and knowledge (e.g., hack-
ing instructions, calls to actions, propaganda) to less experienced 
supporters without revealing the publisher’s identity or location. 
Moreover, Hidden Service Marketplaces (HSMs) that exist on the 
Dark Web, particularly in TOR and the IP2 may remain unknown 
to LEAs for some time. he automated monitoring of such websites, 
marketplaces, forums, and social media, using word/video/image 
recognition sotware, will enable LEAs to search and scrape online 
data in a timely manner.
• Accessing social networks and closed groups: Gaining access, 
monitoring, acquiring evidence, and investigating “closed 
groups” on social networks and closed forums can be challenging. 
Investigators must oten wait several weeks before requesting access 
to their administrators, as time is needed for accounts to seem 
authentic and to develop a realistic backstory. Amplifying individ-
ual weak-signals of online activities by grouping them together with 
other behavioural and contextual factors, of the same and/or other 
persons, can provide a comprehensive picture allowing authorities 
to assess the level of a potential threat to society. he need to engage 
in covert Web investigation to elaborate on their suspicions and 
build a body of evidence requires LEAs to invest in operation time 
which may not produce concrete results, but only further circum-
stantial evidence. hus, an automated process that is able to predict, 
exploit, and respond authentically to common interaction requests 
on social media and Dark Web forums could free up investigators’ 
time and gain access to these closed groups, before being taken over 
by analysts once speciic information is required. 
• Extraction and analysis of multilingual multimedia content: he 
Web is not simply text-based, but is composed of multiple diferent 
content types (including images, video, and audio) published and 
posted in diferent languages, utilising diferent colloquialisms and 
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idioms (e.g., arabizi). For standardisation, any extracted content 
needs to be accurately transcribed, translated, analysed, and cat-
egorised into languages preferred by the end users of the TENSOR 
platform so as to be “interpreted” correctly, and in a timely manner, 
to assist LEA experts in determining their appropriate Course of 
Action (CoA).
• Understanding and identifying terrorists’ perspectives: To pre-
vent terrorism and to successfully tackle the underlying causes of 
radicalisation, LEAs are required to gain a greater understanding 
at an early stage of the psychological preparations and perspectives 
of violent extremists, their religious and ideological beliefs and the 
consequential societal inluences. hese beliefs form the corner-
stone for the claims and desire to ight for religious causes, as well 
as providing the foundations for developing extremist and fanatic 
attitudes, their subsequent aspirations to convert unbelievers, and 
their drive to advance their eforts toward their perceived moral 
betterment of society and social values, such as social justice, soli-
darity and freedom.
2.2 USER REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT
he requirements were developed based on the identiication of user 
groups and user stories. Two likely user groups of the TENSOR plat-
form, as determined by TENSOR partner LEAs, are intelligence oicers 
and operational intelligence analysts. hese user groups were assigned 
to a number of user stories based on what their operational activities 
would be. Each user story forms part of a greater whole known as an 
“epic” which encapsulates a larger use case. Furthermore, the stories 
were also assigned to three categories: ingestion, analysis, and storage. 
hese attributes were combined with the LEAs’ requirements of the 
TENSOR platform. hese correlations allow each user story to address 
a single requirement, assisting the technical partners to understand the 
outcome described and the situation that this requirement will resolve, 
as the following igure depicts.
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FIGURE 1: AGILE USER STORY EXAMPLE
# Type Category As an...<Actor> I can...<Activity> So that...<Efect>
01 Epic Analysis Operational 
Intelligence 
Analyst
Determine whether 
my suspect is 
already known to 
authorities as a 
person of interest 
or involved in 
known terrorist/
organised crime 
groups or online 
communities
I know as much as 
possible about my 
suspect and their 
history
02 Story Ingestion Operational 
Intelligence 
Analyst
Ingest a list of 
persons of interest 
into the TENSOR 
platform
The platform 
knows the persons 
of interest that I am 
interested in
Next, the tools and technologies being developed in TENSOR for satisfy-
ing the distilled user requirements are presented.
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3. TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGY IN TENSOR
he TENSOR platform is composed of a number of components which 
will be integrated into a uniied platform (see Section 3.4). hese com-
ponents include the methods for identiication and extraction of online 
terrorist content (Section 3.1), the analysis of this extracted (textual and 
multimodal) content (Section 3.2), and the summarisation, presenta-
tion, and visualisation of the analysed content for consumption by LEAs 
(Section 3.3). 
3.1 TERRORIST-GENERATED CONTENT ACQUISITION, 
PROCESSING AND INDEXING
he discovery and acquisition of online terrorist-generated content is the 
foundation of the TENSOR platform and all other components depend 
on the provision of this content. We consider online terrorist-generated 
and terrorism-related content to correspond to textual and multimedia 
information available on the Surface, the Deep and Dark Web.
 
3.1.1 TENSOR Data Models and Sources
Each individual piece of content is referred to as an artefact. Examples 
of artefacts may include, among other things, documents, articles, vid-
eos, blog posts, comments and likes. Each artefact may possess many 
attributes, some that are selected and extracted from within the original 
meta-data and others that are attached to the artefact throughout the 
various stages of processing. Attributes describe various aspects of the 
artefact, such as when and from where it was obtained, its unique iden-
tity, and may well reference other artefacts.
Entities are extracted from the actual content of the artefact and repre-
sent the things within the content, e.g., organisations, locations, objects, 
etc. TENSOR is currently developing a comprehensive taxonomy and 
ontology of terrorism-related entities and classes, as well as the indicators 
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required for extracting them from acquired artefacts. here are speciic 
components being developed which will extract entities from both tex-
tual and multimedia content in various supported natural languages and 
dialects. Such extraction gives TENSOR components their mechanism 
for understanding and reasoning against terrorism-related content.
Artefacts and their entities will be linked together, allowing for a graph-
based model to form. It is these links that allow patterns in the data to 
emerge through the various processing mechanisms that will be built 
into the TENSOR processing pipeline.
Acquiring artefacts, entities and links will take place through the vari-
ous types of sources available, both open public and restricted. hese 
sources may be grouped into four distinct tiers when considering both 
the nature of availability and content privacy; these tiers are:
1. Tier 1: Open public non-personal data, including all widely avail-
able published content such as traditional news media sources, 
widely recognised blogs, web feeds (i.e., RSS) and public social 
media streams from organisational groups. his tier of content can, 
but most oten does not contain sensitive or personal data, and is 
usually matter of fact information.
2. Tier 2: Open restricted non-personal data, including generally 
publically available Web forums and social media groups, which 
although oten involves data created by potentially identiiable indi-
viduals, is oten topical information and not personal in nature.
3. Tier 3: Open public personal data, including public facing social 
media proiles and posts which although are oten publicly avail-
able, the author has not necessarily explicitly intended the content 
to be made public. his also covers information that is more likely 
to contain personal discussions, such as social media users sending 
publicly visible messages or comments to each other.
4. Tier 4: Open restricted personal data, including anything that 
requires both authenticated access and an insider proile or avatar 
that is in some way connected to an individual or group in order 
to monitor or acquire their data. his is the most invasive tier of 
content acquisition and should only be used in speciic investigative 
scenarios where the appropriate authorisation is in place.
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Other guidance on these tiers and the levels of authorisation required 
for them may come from sources such as the UK’s National Police 
Chiefs Council (2015) who deine levels of open source investigation and 
research based on the extent to which they are overt or covert investiga-
tions. As TENSOR may operate across the EU, it must be mindful of the 
difering legislations in diferent countries (see Section 4).
3.1.2 Content Acquisition, Crawling, and Extraction
Extraction of content from the Surface, Deep, and Dark Web poses a 
range of challenges for the implementation of the Web crawlers and 
scrapers that are employed to obtain such content. On the Surface Web, 
although there exists a greater body of research, many recent reviews 
(e.g., Weninger, 2016) have noted that extraction methods fail to keep up 
with current Web trends and the dynamic content that is oten served 
to the user. One recommendation is to make use of headless browsers 
to ensure the page is fully rendered before extraction while another is to 
consider the evolving standards that are being brought in by HTML5. 
Content on the Deep Web is oten hidden behind logins and captchas 
that make automated access more complex. Furche et al. (2013), He 
(2013), and Zhao et al. (2016) have all recently proposed mechanisms 
such as adaptions to the XPath extraction method, using reverse link 
searching to identify Deep Web sites in the irst place, or using speciic 
extraction methods for obtaining content from ‘entity’ based sites. 
he Dark Web provides further crawling, mining and extraction 
challenges as site discovery in the irst place is oten more complex. 
Furthermore, many of these sites may be ‘invite only’ or only appear 
for limited time periods. Bouchard et al. (2014) have already proposed 
a system for distinguishing between terrorist and non-terrorist sites on 
the Dark Web, in particular noting that the phraseology used on the two 
types of sites difers massively. Chen (2011) ofered a number of sugges-
tions for mining the Dark Web, while Zhou et al. (2005) introduced a 
knowledge management portal for the storage and retrieval of informa-
tion relating to terrorist groups on the dark web. 
Even within these systems for accessing information across the diferent 
layers of the Web, there also remains a consideration around how much 
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autonomy the TENSOR platform should have when accessing this con-
tent. Too much autonomy and there is a risk of the system being accused 
on conducting surveillance, while too little autonomy will not reduce the 
burden on intelligence analysts’ workload and the platform will not be 
used to its full potential.
3.1.3 Operational Mechanisms
he mechanisms TENSOR aims to use for acquiring content can be 
broken down into two categories, active and passive. Active content 
acquisition covers most uses of the TENSOR content acquisition tools. 
It involves actively making requests against online services for speciic 
types of content via searches and crawling, both of which can leak infor-
mation to the service about the tool’s intentions. Passive acquisition on 
the other hand attempts to take a more hands-of approach, by exploiting 
technologies for monitoring purposes. hese technologies include RSS 
feeds, social media streaming sources, newsletter subscriptions and mail-
ing lists. Passive approaches will be employed as much as possible due to 
their less revealing approach. However, the need for active mechanisms 
emerges during targeted investigations. Nonetheless the salient point to 
keep in mind when conducting such research is the mantra of necessary, 
proportionate and justiied (Association of the Chiefs of Police Oicers 
(ACPO), 2013).  TENSOR will employ mechanisms to resist the function 
creep that pervades in many social media based research tools for law 
enforcement (Trottier, 2013) and the tendency to keep data long beyond 
its usefulness.
During the retrieval stage, all content that is acquired will be given a 
unique identity within the TENSOR platform. Secure Hashing Algorithm 
(SHA) (see Section 3.4.4) will be employed to provide a veriiable iden-
tiier for the content to enable the detection of duplicates as well as to 
protect content from tampering. On top of hashing, Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA) (see Section 3.4.4) will add tamper prooing to the veri-
iable identiier (or hash) allowing downstream components and subjects 
to verify the integrity of the content.
In subsequent stages, TENSOR aims to efectively ilter and anonymise 
all acquired textual and multimedia content. Anything not meeting the 
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minimum required attributes to be considered terrorist-generated or 
related will be removed immediately upon detection. Further processing 
will take place in the TENSOR processing pipeline in order to extract 
entities and links between the discovered and acquired artefacts; some 
of this extraction and classiication will lead to further cyclical searches 
to discover more relevant content.
TENSOR aims to store and manage all artefacts, entities, and links in a 
generic and extensible manner. hese are the main types of data within 
the data acquisition process before additional processing takes over. he 
use of a generic approach enables simpliied indexing of content within 
underlying database technologies. For example, entities can capture 
various types of classes simultaneously such as locations and categories, 
which can be indexed together. his does result in fewer, longer indexes, 
but advantageously provides the capability to deal with entity types that 
were previously unknown.
3.2 MULTI-MODAL CONTENT ANALYSIS
he analysis and correlation of information extracted from multimodal 
content aims to ultimately provide LEAs with threat assessment and 
early warning capabilities, by uncovering the structure underlying the 
terrorism-related information and data through clustering, classiica-
tion, community detection and key player identiication in social net-
works, information source quality assessments, multimedia forensics as 
well as semantic reasoning and enrichment.
3.2.1 Clustering
Clustering aims to group together multimodal objects about similar 
topics so as to reduce information overload and increase corroboration 
through aggregation of multiple sources containing the same informa-
tion. To this end, TENSOR irst applies Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) 
(Ganter & Wille, 1998) using InClose (Andrews, 2011), a determinis-
tic method of deriving a set of hierarchical clusters, each containing a 
set of instances (multimodal objects) that share a number of common 
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attributes, such as the terrorism-related entities identiied in the TENSOR 
taxonomy (including people, objects, locations and events), categories, 
sources, and extracted keywords. he further down the hierarchy one 
travels, the more speciic (more attributes, fewer instances) each cluster 
becomes. Both instances and attributes can appear in multiple clusters. 
Moreover, clustering in TENSOR also relies on methods applied on a 
graph of the multimodal objects, where nodes usually represent tuples 
of multiple modalities (e.g. text-image pairs) and links between any two 
nodes are assigned in an unsupervised or semi-supervised way (Petkos 
et al., 2017). Community detection on this graph provides densely con-
nected patterns of mutually related objects, resulting in communities of 
objects that share similar topics. Extracting the correct number of topics 
is equivalent to the estimation of the correct number of clusters; these are 
typically not known a priori. To estimate this number, TENSOR relies 
on multiple realisations of approaches such as DBSCAN*-Martingale 
(Gialampoukidis et al., 2016b); such methods are robust to noise (i.e. 
can deal with data not belonging to any topic) and are also able to scale 
eiciently.
Experiments performed to evaluate the proposed DBSCAN*-Martingale 
against well-established and parameter-free community detection algo-
rithms were based on four realistic benchmark networks developed by 
Lancichinetti et al. (2008). he results indicate improvements in the 
efectiveness of the proposed DBSCAN*-Martingale community detec-
tion algorithm in terms of the Normalised Mutual Information (Danon 
et al., 2005) and RAND (Rand, 1971) metrics. In particular, the most 
signiicant diferences to the other approaches for both evaluation met-
rics are observed for the smallest dataset where DBSCAN*-Martingale 
indicates improvements ranging from 12% to 35% in terms of NMI and 
from 5.6% to 8.8% in terms of RAND. In the larger datasets, DBSCAN*-
Martingale still performs better than all the other approaches, but the 
diferences in the efectiveness are smaller, particularly for the RAND 
evaluation metric. he second best performing community detection 
approach is Walktrap (Pons & Latapy, 2006), with the exception of NMI 
for the smaller datasets, where the Fast Greedy (Clauset et al., 2004) and 
the Louvain (Blondel et al., 2008) methods perform second best.
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3.2.2 Classiication
Classiication aims to automatically assign the multimodal objects to 
speciic categories, e.g. regarding the level of radicalisation exhibited by a 
document consisting of multiple modalities (such as a Web page or social 
media post) using machine learning and deep learning techniques that 
exploit the rich information from the diferent modalities (e.g. text and 
images) and the inter-connections among them. TENSOR irst employs 
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) to build a text-based model that is 
learnt based on a set of documents annotated with the speciic catego-
ries of interest. Given a new document, the model projects it into the 
produced latent vector space and classiies it to an appropriate category. 
Regarding images, the same methodology is applied with the only dif-
ference that the irst layer uses Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) 
instead of RNNs. During these two classiications, latent vectors are 
extracted for representing respectively the two modalities (i.e. texts and 
images) into similar spaces so as to merge them. Finally, a third model is 
learnt to perform the classiication by fusing together the two modalities; 
in this last case, the main challenge is to deal with documents without 
images and thus make the third model adaptive to this missing input. 
Preliminary experiments indicate promising results for the individual 
modalities using RNNs and CNNs respectively, while further research is 
needed for their combination.
3.2.3 Social Network Analysis
Social Network Analysis aims to detect communities of users (e.g., user 
accounts on forums/social media platforms) engaging in suspicious 
terrorism-related communications and also identify the most impor-
tant and inluential actors with a key role in the connectivity of the 
social network and thus the dissemination of information. For instance, 
Twitter has been extensively used for promoting and spreading terror-
ism-related propaganda due to its nature that permits the inexpensive 
communication of multimodal messages (tweets) to users worldwide; to 
this end, a top-down approach is oten used, with a core group of mem-
bers spreading a terrorist group’s messages, which are then re-shared by 
other ailiated accounts. For both LEAs and the administrators of social 
media networking platforms, it is of vital signiicance to prevent terrorist 
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groups from spreading their propaganda (to the extent possible), by shut-
ting down accounts who are found to play a central role in this informa-
tion exchange. 
To this end, TENSOR employs centrality measures and in particular 
entropy-based centrality measures, such as the Mapping Entropy (ME) 
and the Mapping Entropy Betweenness (MEB) (Gialampoukidis et 
al., 2016a). Intuitively, one may think of a random walker on the net-
work, standing at a node who picks his/her next step with a probability 
equivalent to the degree centrality (in the case of ME) and equivalent 
to the betweenness centrality (in the case of MEB) and is summed over 
all neighbours of a node. hese two measures consider the information 
that is communicated through nodes who act as a hub (bridge), i.e. those 
with high values of degree (betweenness) centrality between any two 
members. In particular, the MEB centrality considers the betweenness 
centrality of a node and also exploits local information from its neigh-
bourhood; hence, high MEB values indicate that a particular node can 
act as a bridge for disseminating information, even if their degree cen-
trality is low. In parallel to the key-player identiication, a community 
detection algorithm is used to divide the network into groups of users 
(communities). he top-ranked key-player is used to enrich the retrieved 
results, which is achieved by searching for the community the key-player 
belongs to (Gialampoukidis et al., 2017).
he proposed centrality measure was evaluated in a network formed 
by user mentions in terrorism-related Twitter accounts, which were 
retrieved using a set of ive Arabic keywords related to terrorist propa-
ganda. As ground-truth, account suspension information from Twitter 
was used, which marks user accounts as suspended, given that the sus-
pension process is applied when an account violates Twitter rules by 
exhibiting abusive behaviour, including posting content related to vio-
lent threats and hate speech. he top-100 user accounts identiied as key 
players were examined to determine whether they are suspended, active 
or no longer exist (i.e., accounts which have been temporarily or perma-
nently deactivated). he results indicate that the entropy-based centrali-
ties ME and MEB are able to retrieve the irst suspended user at position 
16, while PageRank follows at position 19. Other centrality and popular-
ity measures, such as closeness, eigenvector and number of followers do 
not ind any suspended users in the top-100 positions of their retrieved 
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users. We observe that the network is very spread with many bridges and 
a diameter equal to 27, so key players are expected to be positioned in 
between many pairs of nodes in the network, exploiting also their neigh-
bourhood’s high betweenness centrality.
3.2.4 Information Source Quality Assessment
Information source quality assessment employs a multi-dimensional 
viewpoint to interpret the notion of “quality”, e.g. in terms of reliability, 
credibility, relevance, precision, etc. his is then also coupled with mis-
information and disinformation indicators; the former refers to false or 
incorrect information that is spread intentionally or unintentionally (but 
without realising in both cases that the information is untrue), whereas 
the latter refers to intentionally false or misleading information that is 
spread in a calculated way to deceive target audiences. Both mis- and dis-
information correspond in essence to disruptive information that mis-
leads and/or misdirects LEAs during their investigations. To this end, 
TENSOR explores an axiomatic framework based on a combination of 
theories modelling uncertainty (such as Dempster-Shafer) and machine 
learning algorithms.
3.2.5 Multimedia Forensics
Multimedia forensics aims to detect digital manipulations (in particu-
lar splicing and copy-move manipulations) on online images. he main 
challenges pertain to the extensive degradation of online content due to 
the large number of re-savings (between the originally captured image 
and the image that is published online) and the excessive computational 
cost of powerful forensic analysis methods. Given the fact that a num-
ber of diferent approaches have been proposed in the literature, each 
of which has shown to be successful only under speciic assumptions 
and cases (Zampoglou et al., 2017), the TENSOR toolbox implements a 
number of complementary approaches that can be applied on demand to 
multimedia content of interest. 
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3.2.6 Semantic Reasoning and Enrichment
Finally, semantic reasoning and enrichment aims to irst semantically 
represent all pertinent information into a network of interconnected 
ontologies, capitalising on advanced knowledge representation and 
intelligent context-based reasoning solutions; information from external 
sources (such as other terrorism-related datasets) can also be integrated 
into these ontologies. Semantic reasoning is then used to further enrich 
this data, by deriving facts from the relations between concepts on an 
individual and collective level so as to enable the detection of unusual 
event and activity patterns, whilst recognising novel instances of usual 
patterns.
3.3 MULTI-MODAL SUMMARISATION
In TENSOR, one of the objectives is to present to the users the gist of 
potentially relevant material discovered on the Web in terms of a sum-
mary in the language of preference of the user, and to facilitate the inter-
active exploration of this material using visual analytics techniques. 
he summarisation module is still at an early stage of development: the 
general architecture has been deined, but not all submodules have been 
integrated or implemented. In this section, we describe the modules 
needed in order to produce the summaries and visualise the results.
Nowadays, the most popular summarisation strategy is “extractive”, 
which tends to select entire sentences from the original text source(s), 
based on some relevance metrics. he most relevant sentences are con-
catenated into a summary; see, e.g., (Diligenti et al., 2004) for an over-
view. Although extractive summarisation can be realised with little lin-
guistic analysis and the resulting summaries are always grammatically 
correct, they oten lack coherence. Furthermore, the original and the 
summary are in the same language. 
Opposed to extractive summarisation is abstractive summarisation. 
Starting from a conceptual representation of the original information 
obtained by language analysis, abstractive summarisation creates inter-
mediate linguistic or conceptual structures from this representation, 
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selects the most relevant content chunks and then generates a summary 
using Natural Language Generation (NLG) techniques. he implemen-
tation of our abstractive summariser is based on a sequence of modules 
that realise the sequence of transitions between diferent strata. he 
pipeline can be divided into three main parts:
1. Language analysis: Language analysis is carried out by a text anal-
ysis pipeline that takes as input the textual content of a document 
in a given language. his content is irst analysed and represented 
as a forest of abstract syntactic trees. In the case that the input lan-
guage is diferent from English, every lexeme in the tree is mapped 
onto an English lexeme using bilingual dictionaries in order to 
arrive at a kind of inter-lingua structure that facilitates language 
neutral representations. hese English “inter-lingua” structures are 
mapped onto semantic structures modelled as RDF triples and then 
to an ontology.
2. Text planning: Conceptual summarisation is approached by 
assessing the relevance of the semantic structures produced by the 
language analysis step. Relevance is assessed according to multiple 
criteria, such as the frequency and joint mention of speciic contents 
in the analysed texts, and lexical-semantic and conceptual related-
ness of contents according to lexical databases, sense embeddings 
and ontologies. Additionally, any inferred knowledge relevant to 
the domain, the use cases or the production of natural language 
should also be considered. By considering aspects related to the end 
user of the system, summaries can be generated tailored to speciic 
users. In addition to determining the relevance of contents, our text 
planning component also attempts to guarantee a degree of coher-
ence in the summary generated by sorting relevant contents in a 
sequence that satisies certain coherence constraints, e.g. grouping 
together in the text contents that are conceptually related. 
3. Natural language generation: Following this planning step, lin-
guistic generation starts by transferring the lexemes associated 
to the semantic structures to the desired target language, using 
available multilingual lexical resources. hen, the structure of the 
sentence is determined and all grammatical words are introduced 
and linked with syntactic relations. Finally, all morphological 
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agreements between the words are resolved, the words are ordered 
and punctuation signs are introduced.
In the following, we give more details about the aforementioned modules: 
language analysis (Sections 3.3.1 to3.3.5), text planning (Section3.3.6), 
and language generation (Sections 3.3.7 to 3.3.11), as well as visual ana-
lytics (Section 3.3.12). Figure 2 shows all the components analysed in the 
following sections and the connections between them.
FIGURE 2: OVERVIEW OF THE SUMMARISATION PIPELINE
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3.3.1 Sentence splitting and tokeniser
Language analysis starts by determining sentence and token boundaries. 
Rather than addressing tokenisation at a word level, our analysis pipeline 
treats each sequence of words referring to a speciic entity as an atomic 
unit of meaning. In doing so, we seek to avoid unnecessary internal anal-
ysis of multiword expressions which may not even have a strictly compo-
sitional meaning (as, e.g., United States of America), and also to eventu-
ally obtain predicate-argument structures in which the arguments are 
not just words, but expressions with an atomic meaning.
3.3.2 Surface-syntactic parsing
In order to determine the syntactic structure of each sentence, we use 
Bohnet & Nivre’s (2012) joint lemmatiser, part of speech tagger, mor-
phology tagger, and dependency parser trained on the CoNLL’09 Penn 
Treebank dataset (Hajič et al., 2009). his system was the irst one to 
be able to parse non-projective dependency trees while predicting at the 
same time the part of speech (PoS) and the dependencies, instead of pre-
dicting irst the PoS and using it for predicting the dependencies in a sec-
ond step. he authors report an Unlabeled Attachment Score of 93.67, a 
Labeled Attachment Score of 92.68, and a PoS tagging accuracy of 97.42 
(the best possible score being 100 in all cases) in English, improving the 
state-of-the-art in several languages at the time of publication, and still 
competitive with current state-of-the-art systems. he sentence splitting, 
tokenisation and parsing steps require together an average of 65 millisec-
onds of processing time per sentence.
3.3.3 Deep-syntactic parsing
he objective of this component is to identify and remove all functional 
words (auxiliaries, determiners, void prepositions and conjunctions) in 
the surface-syntactic tree and to generalise the syntactic dependencies 
obtained during the previous stage, while adding sub-categorisation 
information for lexical predicates. he resulting structures ater this 
step are deep-syntactic trees, in the sense of the Meaning-Text heory 
(Mel’čuk, 1988), which is the theoretical framework that underlies the 
56
PROCEEDINGS • XVI • 2017 • FROM RESEARCH TO SECURITY UNION
whole natural language processing pipeline. he mapping between sur-
face and deep syntactic trees can be achieved using rule-based (Mille et 
al., 2017b) or statistical (Ballesteros et al., 2014) graph-transduction sys-
tems. Both systems are able to perform the removal of functional words 
(hypernode identiication) with an accuracy of about 99%, and derive the 
deep dependencies with a recall of about 91% (LAS) in English, for which 
it is possible to rely on good quality lexical resources (see next section). 
he deep-syntactic parsing step is currently performed in an average of 
25 milliseconds per sentence.
3.3.4 Coreference resolution, word sense disambiguation and entity 
linking
his step comprises tasks aimed at determining the lexical sense, con-
ceptual meaning or denoted entity of speciic words or groups of words 
in the text. Several state-of-the-art methods and resources for corefer-
ence resolution, word sense disambiguation, named entity recognition 
and entity linking are being considered. Lexical databases and knowl-
edge bases like WordNet (Miller, 1995), PropBank (Kingsbury & Palmer, 
2002), VerbNet (Schuler, 2005), FrameNet (Baker et al., 1998), DBPedia 
(Auer et al., 2007) and BabelNet (Navigli & Ponzetto, 2012) can be used 
as repositories of senses and entities, possibly extended with domain spe-
ciic knowledge compiled in collaboration with user partners. For the 
coreference resolution task, we will experiment with both simple baseline 
methods, e.g., best mention method based on well-studied syntactic and 
lexical constraints, and advanced methods such as those implemented 
in the Standford CoreNLP tools (Manning et al., 2014). Similarly, we 
will consider a range of methods and tools for the disambiguation and 
linking tasks, ranging from baselines known to perform well, e.g., most 
frequent sense, to more complex methods, i.e., those based on features 
extracted from the local context of mentions of entities, or graph-based 
global disambiguation methods that aim at producing coherent sets of 
sense assignments. 
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3.3.5 Mapping to abstract representations
his component outputs representations that facilitate the mapping 
to the TENSOR ontologies. For mapping deep-syntactic structures to 
more abstract linguistic representations, large-scale lexical resources 
are needed. Unfortunately, such resources are available, at this point, 
only for English. For this reason, we need to map all input languages 
to English. Using multilingual resources such as BabelNet, it is pos-
sible to obtain the translations of all words into English. Once this is 
done, the sub-categorisation information in the deep-syntactic structure 
allows us to obtain Frame annotations on top of connected predicate-
argument structures. During this step, shared argumental positions are 
made explicit and idiosyncratic structuring such as the representation of 
raising and control verbs is generalised. From the implementation per-
spective, this task is very similar to that of deep-syntactic parsing, i.e., 
we are developing graph transducers in order to achieve it. he whole 
analysis pipeline – from text to abstract representations – has undergone 
preliminary evaluation in English and obtained Unlabeled Attachment 
Scores of 74% and 71% for precision and recall respectively (see Mille et 
al., 2017b), and needs about 150 milliseconds per sentence.
3.3.6 Text planning
Our approach to text planning assumes either a deep linguistic repre-
sentation with semantic annotations (i.e., disambiguated word senses, 
links to denoted entities) or a fully conceptual representation based on 
domain ontologies and upper models if and when it becomes available. 
As explained before, the main tasks of this module are to assess the rel-
evance of the contents and to structure them in a way that guarantees a 
coherent presentation in the text. Drawing from the literature in text-to-
text summarisation and data-to-text planning, we will experiment with 
graph-based methods to explore and rank the contents in the semantic 
repository according to multiple criteria. his method will be supported 
by recently published resources like semantically annotated corpora and 
distributional sense embeddings. Additionally, pattern extraction meth-
ods will be considered to obtain maximally relevant subsets of contents 
from the semantic repository, while seeking to ensure that grammatically 
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and semantically correct clauses and sentences can be generated out of 
them.
3.3.7 Mapping to output language predicate-argument structures
Starting from the structures provided by the text planning module, irst, 
some idiosyncratic transformations are made to adjust the structures to 
the predicate-argument format understood by our generation pipeline, 
and then, the English labels of the nodes are translated into the desired 
target language using lexicons. hese lexicons must not only contain 
language-speciic vocabulary, but also be linked to our pivot language, 
namely English. Given that BabelNet senses annotated during the analy-
sis stage are language-independent, we will use them as the cross-lin-
guistic link.
3.3.8 Mapping to syntactic structures
Once genuine predicate-argument structures in the target language are 
available, the irst task is to ind which node in each structure is most 
likely to be the root of the dependency tree. hat is, we want to identify 
what will be the main verb of the sentence, or the word that triggers its 
appearance. Around the main node, the deep-syntacticisation module 
builds the rest of the syntactic structure of the sentence. In particular, it 
is able to decide if a main predicate has to be introduced, or what will be 
realised as an argument, an attribute, or a coordination. he next step in 
the procedure is to obtain surface-syntactic structures, i.e., to generate 
all functional words and label the dependencies with language-speciic 
relations, that is, the opposite actions to the ones performed during the 
deep-syntactic analysis step. As a generator, we also use graph transduc-
ers, as described in (Mille et al., 2017a), together with language-speciic 
lexical resources; see, e.g., (Mille & Wanner, 2015). he resulting struc-
ture contains all the words that will appear in the inal sentence, together 
with morpho-syntactic features and syntactic dependencies such as sub-
ject, object, etc. that link the words with one another.
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3.3.9 Morphological agreement resolution
During the generation of syntactic structures, morphological features of 
individual words are already inserted (e.g., nominative case for a German 
subject). During the transition to the morphological structure, agree-
ment is established using the introduced morphological features and the 
ine-grained syntactic relations in the surface-syntactic structure. For 
instance, a verb will get its number and person from the element linked 
to it with the subject dependency relation.
3.3.10 Surface form retrieval
he surface forms of the words are retrieved using a full-form dictionary. 
In order to obtain the full-form dictionary, we will run the morphologi-
cal tagger of our surface syntactic parser on a large collection of texts and 
store each possible combination of surface form, lemma and morpholog-
ical features. We will therefore be able to retrieve a surface form given a 
lemma and a set of morphological features. he size of the text collection 
is crucial in order to ensure a large coverage.
3.3.11 Linearisation
his component takes as input surface-syntactic trees and determines 
the word order for each tree. In order to ensure large coverage, linearis-
ers will be trained on existing surface-syntactic treebanks, following 
what has been done in, e.g., (Bohnet et al., 2011), in which the system per-
forms a beam search for optimal word ordering. Words are eventually 
ordered with a bottom-up method, starting from within subtrees and 
then ordering subtrees with one another. his linearisation system has 
obtained high scores on English datasets, with a BLEU score above 89%, 
and about 58% of the sentences in which all words are ordered exactly 
as expected.
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3.3.12 Visual analytics
Visual analytics algorithms aim to present to the users the analysed 
and correlated data in a clear and concise interface that allows them to 
navigate through this information naturally and to improve their situ-
ational awareness. For instance, in order to track and l ag terrorism-
related activities in social media networks, LEAs face big challenges in 
monitoring relationships and communication activities taking place in 
such complex networks. To this end, TENSOR proposes a visualisation 
tool (Andreadis et al., 2017) that of ers two novel functionalities based 
on the key-player identii cation and key-community detection methods 
(described in Section 3.2). Both are exposed as a combined Web ser-
vice and are performed on data from social networks that can be dis-
tinguished into statistics, key players and key communities, as demon-
strated in Figure 3 for an example from Twitter.
FIGURE 3: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYTICS VISUALISATION
h e network constitutes a straightforward visual representation of how 
Twitter accounts mention each other and the communities they for-
mulate. Every node in the graph represents a user (proi le picture is 
shown on the node), while every edge is a connection between two users. 
Communities are indicated by dif erent coloured borders around the 
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nodes; if an account is inactive, the respective node is coloured red and 
labelled as “Suspended!” or is coloured black and labelled as “Does not 
exist!” depending on the case. By clicking on a node, a window pops up 
to provide more information about the selected user. he pop-up win-
dow contains a proile picture on the top let and some account details on 
the top right, followed by a list of all tweets posted by the featured user. 
he account details include a name, a username, a description written by 
the user, a link to the original Twitter page and a label to inform whether 
the user is suspended or non-existent. Regarding the list of tweets, each 
item has external links, if any, they are sorted by date and linked to the 
original tweet. he implementation is based entirely on open-source 
tools and can be adapted beyond Twitter to instant messaging and other 
platforms.
3.4 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
TENSOR aims to capture, understand and accommodate as many end-
user requirements and technical considerations from the earliest stage 
possible. his section addresses just some of these points by presenting 
both a high-level overview of the TENSOR architecture and implemen-
tation, whilst introducing a small subset of lower-level considerations 
and challenges where they help elucidate the TENSOR solution.
Developing and implementing a platform such as TENSOR is ambitious 
and presents many challenges. Although many of these challenges are 
focussed heavily on the research and delivery of beyond-state-of-the-art 
tools and technologies aimed to assist LEAs in identifying, monitor-
ing and ultimately combatting terrorism. Behind the scenes there are a 
myriad of considerations that need to be made to protect the integrity, 
security, and operation of such tools as well as ensuring straightforward 
integration and availability. If LEAs are ever going to trust and rely on 
such technologies, whether independently or within a consolidated plat-
form such as TENSOR, then it is important that under the hood, it is 
built on an opaque foundation of good pragmatic standards (some of 
which are introduced in the following sections) and technologies that 
support the legal and ethical requirements and constraints imposed on 
LEAs. Furthermore, although TENSOR’s output will only be a research 
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prototype, it is useful to keep in mind some of the proposed security 
standards required by law enforcement organisations to run an opera-
tional product (e.g., PoliceICT, 2017).  
3.4.1 TENSOR Architectural Realisation
he TENSOR platform’s design loosely follows a Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) with the main deviation coming from not all com-
ponents being entirely stateless and the need for a centralised taxonomy 
and ontology. From a high-level, the system is broken down into many 
modules or components (deined as services) within three distinctive 
phases:
1. Discovery and acquisition
2. Analysis and storage
3. Reporting and visualisation
he discovery and acquisition of terrorism-related content will be the 
source of all data within the system. From here, identiied content from 
a growing collection of crawl points will begin its life within the system. 
It will be given an identity and veriiable hash (see Section 3.4.4) which 
will uniquely identify each individual piece of content for as long as it 
is maintained within the system, its archive, or it is deemed irrelevant 
or unnecessary and is destroyed. his portion of the system consists of 
several components as discussed earlier in this paper whose responsi-
bility it is to search, crawl, scrape, and interact with various Web- and 
darknet-based services and sources. he aim is to identify and capture 
content related to the many aspects of terrorism and terrorist organisa-
tions. Once ingested, the data will be passed onto the next phase in order 
to determine its relevance and validity before it is stored or destroyed.
he analysis and storage phase aims initially to identify for every new 
piece of content - artefacts and entities - whether it is relevant to the 
subject of terrorism and whether it is in the interest of both public secu-
rity and the LEA. TENSOR also aims to capture the key principles of 
privacy-by-design (Langheinrich, 2001; Cavoukian, 2011) in this phase 
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to ensure that only data that is absolutely necessary is kept. Any data 
identiied as irrelevant will be immediately destroyed with no further 
processing, whilst the remainder will be stored in the central content 
repository. From this point on, select content attributes will be made 
available on a component-by-component basis for further processing, so 
that new knowledge and insights can be attained. his higher-level new 
knowledge will be stored in the central repository and made available to 
the next phase.
he inal phase involves the interaction between the end users and the 
relevant TENSOR content and knowledge. hese components aim to 
provide the tools for end users to explore and visualise the outputs of the 
various novel techniques and technologies being developed in TENSOR. 
Not only that, but they will also have the ability to inluence all three 
phases of the architecture on a case-by-case basis by retrieving and visu-
alising speciic sources or types of content and re-coniguring the plat-
form’s operational focus. his is considered the value phase of the sys-
tem, where the culmination of the TENSOR components and the overall 
SOA approach provides the end user with insights that they wouldn’t 
have had otherwise. 
Across each of these phases will be the growing burden of potentially 
massive quantities of data that the platform may have to deal with, for 
which there is little solution other than allocating and managing large 
storage capacities. For that, clever data management techniques will need 
to be assessed and implemented. One such issue is the data growth rate, 
which cannot be mitigated efectively for multimedia given that Web-
based multimedia content is oten already compressed close to practical 
limits and although further compression is a possibility, it ofers little or 
no gain. he only real defence is to ensure that multimedia content is not 
duplicated, achievable by indexing the content hashes (see Section 3.4.4). 
Textual content on the other hand can be easily, eiciently and efectively 
compressed automatically via many database technologies.
3.4.2 TENSOR Services Orchestration 
For these phases to work efectively, the inter-component communica-
tion will be standardised where possible and appropriate. he use of 
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representational state transfer (REST) interfaces over secure hypertext 
transfer protocol (HTTPS) connections with JSON and/or XML as the 
representations of in-transit data appears to have a monopoly in the sot-
ware industry today. TENSOR makes no aim to deviate from this secure, 
straight-forward, and trusted approach, but does aim to ensure the best 
compromises are made between security, complexity and usability are 
maintained throughout.
At the core of the system will be the central content repository. Not only 
is this component responsible for managing the storage of all TENSOR 
content and knowledge, but also the auditing of all activities and interac-
tions with the system. Such auditing is crucial to ensuring the required 
level of trust and reliability for the use of valuable investigative outcomes 
in the chain of custody. All of this begins with the fundamental require-
ment of identity.
3.4.3 Managing Identity
he importance of identity means that every individual piece of con-
tent and knowledge created, discovered, stored, or accessed using the 
TENSOR platform needs to be uniquely identiiable throughout its 
entire lifetime. TENSOR aims to achieve this using Universally Unique 
Identiiers (UUIDs) for each and every artefact, entity, and relationship 
as well as every audited event. Using UUIDs ensures that wherever a 
piece of data starts its life within the TENSOR platform, it can be allo-
cated an identity without any central coordination whilst conident in 
the knowledge that the possibility of the same UUID being generated 
elsewhere in the platform is almost zero.
here are four UUID versions available (Leach et al., 2005), however the 
expected data growth rates for the platform do not even come close to 
the operational limitations of properly generated UUIDs, so because of 
this, they can be chosen based on additional available features and pop-
ularity. Version 1 and 4 are the most popular implementations, which 
can be respectively classiied as machine-and-clock based, and securely 
random. Version 1 is more attractive based on the additional meta-data 
contained within the UUID. hat is a combination of the MAC address 
of the computer on which it was generated and the time to the nearest 
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100-nanoseconds, including the central processing unit’s (CPU) current 
clock cycle, making it near impossible to see the same UUID twice over 
an inconceivable period of time. he additional beneit of version 1 on 
top of maintaining an audit of the time in which it was generated, is 
the MAC address which reveals the actual machine that created it. his 
could be useful for the future veriication of the data’s original source.
Once all data can be uniquely identiied within the platform, it is then 
possible to log every state change and activity which takes place against 
each unique piece of data. TENSOR will aim to ensure that this log-
ging is duplicated automatically from the point of creation on both the 
machine performing the action, in the way of log iles, and within the 
central storage repository in order to ensure multiple sources of the same 
truth. For every action taking place involving a piece of TENSOR data, 
its original and unique UUID will be logged with a description of the 
type of action taking place. Examples of such actions that may be carried 
out on an artefact or entity include: initial discovery or acquisition; stor-
age; processing; retrieval; visualisation; and removal or archiving.
Each time an action or state change is logged, where there is a process or 
user responsible, this should also be recorded in order to ensure account-
ability is always present. TENSOR will aim to ensure that there is no 
situation where an action can be performed, or the state of the data be 
changed, where there is no accountable party.
3.4.4 Content Security and Veriiability
Another important and widely used aspect of chain of custody is to 
ensure the authenticity of the data, primarily to prove that it has not 
been tampered with in any way since it was originally obtained (Prayudi 
& Sn, 2015). he current buzz word for LEAs regarding this is “hashing”. 
For example, Interpol already maintains a database of hashed images of 
child abuse material, which enables the rapid identiication of whether 
a found image is new or not and can help in tracing the source of such 
images (Interpol, 2017; McCulloch, 2007). A hashing algorithm, as it is 
known, performs a cryptographic calculation against the underlying 
data of an artefact, entity, or media ile, and generates a relatively short 
and unique “hash” of the data. he algorithm can easily be re-run at any 
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point against the subject data and if even 1-bit (or a character in a text 
ile, or a pixel in an image), then the generated hash will be completely 
diferent. In fact, this variation in the hashes is what makes them highly 
reliable. For example, although it may be possible to ind or generate two 
sets of data that would lead to the same hash, it is extremely unlikely that 
both of these could be valid data of the same type - such as both being 
images, never mind images that are similar. But, it remains critical that 
a suitable hashing algorithm, such as the Secure Hashing Algorithm is 
employed and done so correctly.
TENSOR’s aim is to go one step further than hashes alone by investigat-
ing the viability and potential additional trust in authenticity gained by 
combining hashes with the use of Digital Signature Algorithm technol-
ogy (Kravitz, 1993). Where, for instance, a hash cannot be changed to 
result in the same media, there is no guarantee that the media hasn’t 
been changed, along with the hash given alongside it. Using DSA would 
allow the content to be hashed in the same way as before, but to also sign 
the hash with a #veriiable digital signature. It would thus be possible 
to verify not only that the subject media (or artefact) is authentic, but 
also that it was actually created by a given component and has not been 
tampered with.
On the subject of tampering, another important consideration in the 
development of the TENSOR platform is ensuring the accountability and 
auditing of activities and that data cannot easily, if at all, be manipulated. 
Primarily, the project aims to explore write-once read-many (WORM) 
technologies. hese however, can be expensive and require more com-
plex physical hardware and processes to be in place. So, whilst the aim is 
to investigate and outline recommendations in the use of such technol-
ogy, soter approaches should also be considered. One way this could be 
achieved is by implementing tightly secured write-once database restric-
tions with insert-only privileges and ensuring regular hard backups.
Generally, within the platform, the aim is to mandate efective data secu-
rity practices across the board, but particularly within the central con-
tent repository. Such mandates include, but are not limited to, the use 
of good standards-based encryption throughout. Primarily this occurs 
at two obvious points: when data is in transit; and when data is at rest. 
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) is widely used and heavily standardised. 
It is also relatively easy to use and conigure and should be employed 
for all inter-component or inter-server communications, even within 
internal systems. Encryption at rest, on the other hand, deals with 
any data stored on a physical or virtual storage device, whether live or 
backup. Again, this is relatively easy to implement and is ofered by many 
database management systems with the use of strong standards-based 
encryption algorithms. It should be noted that ensuring encryption keys 
are securely managed and all core principles around the chosen stan-
dards or algorithms is adhered to is vital for success.
3.4.5 Future Prooing Architecture 
Containerisation of sotware applications, particularly in the micro-ser-
vices variation of SOA, has been a rapidly growing area of development 
in the industry. It allows a sotware application to be wrapped in a stan-
dardised container, along with its production coniguration and its very 
own operating system stack - including irewalls. hese containers can 
be rapidly deployed in a standard way and oten need only to be plugged 
together.
TENSOR aims to utilise containerisation, in particular using Docker 
(https://www.docker.com/), to enable the development teams of each 
component to conigure and deploy how they see it following black-box 
principles. As long as each partner respects the agreed inter-component 
communication protocols, then much of the production-level integra-
tion becomes efectively a plumbing problem. On top of this, the use of 
scalable messaging platforms within the platform integration layer is 
also being considered, which aims to exploit powerful high-availability 
sotware principles.
Finally, it is envisaged that TENSOR will not only achieve many excit-
ing and challenging research goals with its many state-of-the-art and 
beyond-state-of-the-art tools and techniques, but it will also be built in 
such a way as to enable the highest possible technology readiness and 
best possible future exploitation opportunities. Much of this will be a 
result of the project’s forward-thinking architectural focus and efective 
partner cooperation.
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4. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASSESSMENT
he improvement of current regulatory framework is one of the main 
scopes of TENSOR. A harmonised legal framework is of foremost impor-
tance when it comes to the cross-border cooperation of LEAs. In this 
chapter, we present a general overview of the existing legal procedures in 
Spain, Greece, Germany and the United Kingdom related to the crime 
of terrorism.
4.1. SPAIN
In Spain, there are ive diferent public organisations (in three difer-
ent levels: National, State and Regional) with authorisation to deal with 
counter terrorism afairs.
he Spanish Criminal Code provides special penal sanctions against ter-
rorism by punishing those who belong to, serve, or collaborate with ter-
rorist organisations or groups (Ministerio de Justicia-Secretaria General 
Tecnica, 2013). he key approach was the deinition of a terrorist organisa-
tion or group and the classiication of all related illegal behaviours, such as 
participation in terrorist organisations or groups, and/or simple collabora-
tion with them. Furthermore, the Criminal Code also considers as crimes, 
individual terrorism and other new types of conduct which impact on the 
international community, including computer criminal ofences.
here are some provisions in the Spanish Criminal Procedure Law 
(Ministerio de Gracia y Justicia, 2015) regulating the interception of tele-
phone and telematic communications. However, a judicial authorisation 
has to be issued in order to legally use these investigative methods. he 
competent Magistrate or the Public Prosecution Services may authorise 
the Judiciary Police to act under an assumed identity in undercover oper-
ations. he undercover agent can only carry out actions necessary to the 
investigation and proportionate with its purpose.  he Spanish Organic 
Law 15/1999 (BOE-A-1999-23750,1999) intends to guarantee and pro-
tect the public liberties and fundamental rights of people regarding the 
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processing of their personal data. However, this Law and the General 
Data Protection Regulation are not applicable to the processing of iles 
related to the investigation of terrorism and serious forms of organised 
crime, or the investigation of other serious criminal ofences. 
Furthermore, the current Spanish legislation does not provide any refer-
ence for the use of search robots in police work. he Criminal Procedure 
Law introduces provisions concerning the retention of data and other 
information contained in computers or other electronic devices in 
order to preserve the integrity and eligibility of these materials in court 
proceedings.
4.2. GREECE
An electronic investigation should always respect the fundamental 
human rights stipulated in articles 19 of the Constitution (Hellenic 
Parliament, 2008) on secrecy of letters and all other forms of free cor-
respondence or communication and 9A of the Constitution for the 
protection of personal data. However, the Greek legal framework rec-
ognises exceptions to the absolute character of these rights for reasons 
of national security or for the investigation of especially serious crimes, 
under articles 3 and 4 of Law 2225/1994 (Hellenic Parliament, 1994) on 
the conidentiality of communications, and article 253A of the Criminal 
Procedure Code (Hellenic Parliament, 2004) on the investigation of 
criminal groups. Within this scope, the Hellenic Police can proceed to 
an undercover investigation, ater formal authorisation has been issued 
by the Prosecutor, or the Prosecutors’ Council.
Generally, there are no restrictions on collecting evidence for judicial 
purposes or police investigations in the case of a serious ofence under 
article 251 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Hellenic Parliament, 2003). 
he admissibility of automatically generated evidence should also be 
considered, meaning that as acceptable evidence in court is considered 
the electronic evidence could be recreated. he Greek legal system stipu-
lates in article 46 paragraph 2 of the Penal Code (Hellenic Parliament, 
1951) that whoever intentionally incites others to commit a crime is con-
sidered as an agent provocateur. Only the participation in a pre-planned 
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illegal act, within the framework of an oicial judicial order could be 
exonerated.
4.3. GERMANY 
In Germany, the term terrorist ofence describes every act that aims to 
seriously intimidate the population or to force or deter public authorities 
or international organisations from doing something. In addition, ter-
rorist ofence describes the act of destabilising or destroying the politi-
cal, constitutional, economic, or social basic structures of Germany or 
an international organisation. he lawful interception is regulating the 
monitoring of telecommunications activities and contents. he legal basis 
is given by the respective laws such as §100a of the Criminal Procedure 
Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 2014), the G10 Commission (Basic 
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2014) and §23a of the Customs 
Investigation Service Act (Germany, 2013). German Intelligence Services 
as well as LEAs could work undercover to obtain information to prevent 
and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. 
In Germany, it is a fundamental right to ensure the conidentiality and 
the integrity of information technology systems, in order to protect 
the personal data stored or processed in information technology sys-
tems. Infringements of this right are possible within narrow bounds. 
Preventive state interventions – especially in the framework of online 
searches – are only permissible constitutionally, if factual indications 
exist of a concrete danger to a predominantly important legal interest.
he usage of search robots is not mentioned within the German legal 
framework. However, the collection of special types of personal data 
is permissible only in so far as inter alia such collection concerns data 
which the data subject has evidently made public or such collection is 
necessary in order to avert a substantial threat to public safety. he col-
lection and storage of terrorist content for the purpose of the evaluation 
of evidence, danger prevention, or the prosecution of a criminal ofence 
is not illegal in Germany. he act of encouraging an individual to com-
mit a crime violates the basic principle of fair proceedings.
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4.4. UNITED KINGDOM
First and foremost, terrorism is a crime, which has serious consequences 
and requires to be distinguished from other types of crime. Individuals who 
commit terrorism-related ofences contrary to UK law are subject to the pro-
cesses of the Criminal Justice System and those who are otherwise believed 
to be involved in terrorism are subject to restrictive executive actions. 
he British LEAs use all available powers and tactics to prevent and detect 
crime or disorder and maintain public safety. Undercover policing is one 
of those tactics. Applied correctly, and supported by appropriate training, 
it is a proportionate, lawful, and ethical tactic which provides an efective 
means of obtaining evidence and intelligence, and includes the identiica-
tion of online terrorist content. he purpose of undercover police oicers 
is to detect or prevent a more serious crime, and to allow an undercover 
asset to gain the trust of the criminals they are trying to iniltrate. English 
law ofers a defense to someone accused of a crime if they can show an 
oicer acted as an agent provocateur, i.e., they initiated or instigated the 
crime. 
he Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) (Great Britain, 1998) is the primary 
piece of UK legislation governing the protection of data. At the heart of 
the DPA is a set of eight principles, which deal with the collection, use, 
quality, and security of personal data and with data subjects’ rights. 
Public authorities can use online research and investigation tools for a 
speciic and legitimate objective – such as preventing or detecting crime, 
proportionate to the objective in question and in accordance with the law 
– but they must ensure not to interfere with a person’s right to privacy.
he collection of online illegal content by UK LEAs is governed by the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) (Great Britain, 2000), 
regulating the powers of public bodies to carry out surveillance and inves-
tigation, and covering the interception of communications. It is an ofence 
to intercept post/public telecommunications within the UK unless autho-
rised under RIPA or another statute (or have consent). A national best 
practice guide for Digital Evidence has been produced to provide guidance 
not only to law enforcement, but all stakeholders who assist in investigat-
ing cyber security incidents and crime (Williams, 2012).
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5. IMPACT
he TENSOR research and designed prototype solutions will have a sig-
niicant impact on several security operational challenges. he social 
impact of deploying the TENSOR solution in operational environments 
will enable LEAs and Security Agencies to increase accuracy towards 
actionable threat intelligence, make more informed decisions and deliver 
elevated preventive power. Delivering the platform in the LEAs opera-
tional settings will contribute to increased public safety and reduced risk 
of terrorist activities, whilst protecting fundamental human rights, such 
as freedom of expression and privacy, thanks to the built-in data protec-
tion and anonymisation capabilities of the platform. he early warning 
of terrorist content or the emergence of networks will allow for early 
interventions, allowing prevention of radicalisation without criminalisa-
tion of subjects.
TENSOR will also contribute to technical and scientiic ields. Its inno-
vation activities will improve Web crawling techniques for faster, more 
eicient content detection and gathering. Research will also focus on 
efective content gathering from hard to reach silos on the Dark Web and 
will deliver better information extraction techniques that can deal with 
larger amounts of multimedia and multilingual content, enable the pro-
cessing of highly diverse and previously under-utilised online content. 
Finally, it will improve automated analysis and data mining approaches 
that help identify relationships between content, the identiication of 
narratives and trends, and the extraction of spatio-temporal patterns of 
interest.
5.1 IMPACTS ON HOW LEAS FIGHT TERRORISM
TENSOR will provide a uniied platform that enables LEAs to efectively 
detect, categorise, analyse, reason over, and summarise terrorist-gener-
ated content. Ultimately, this will increase LEAs capabilities in detecting 
and preventing terrorist activities organised via the Web, culminating in 
increased security and resilience across the EU. TENSOR will empower 
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LEAs to scale their responsiveness and efectiveness through the hori-
zontal difusion of information. It will also ensure LEAs beneit from a 
greater range of operational responses thanks to the early identiication 
of terrorist generated content.
he platform will also leverage intelligent mechanisms that identify 
potential emerging terrorist activities planned and organised via the 
Internet and make use of enhanced capabilities to support the early 
detection and identiication of online radicalisation.
It is envisaged that the research will also support the deployment of more 
efective techniques for distinguishing non-harming religious (or other) 
extremist ideologies from violent radicalisation activities and employ 
more efective capabilities in gathering data from the Dark Web, which 
were previously hidden or inaccessible to them. he solutions will also 
identify patterns as well as uniform responses and prevention measures, 
which will be undertaken at a strategic level. hese impacts are essential 
to the operational delivery of counter terrorism security in today’s ever-
changing world. 
5.2 ECONOMIC IMPACT
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) campaigns for law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism work have become a complex and resource intensive 
task for both Government and Defence intelligence agencies. OSINT 
work has gained momentum to become recognised as a legitimate area 
of intelligence operations, alongside the more traditional intelligence 
domains such as HUMINT (agent handling) and SIGINT (signals intel-
ligence). his is particularly true in the domain of counter-terrorism. 
Nearly all Government and Defence intelligence agencies have resources 
dedicated to the production of OSINT within the intelligence cycle in 
order to meet their intelligence requirements and to produce actionable 
outputs. 
he security and ICT market segments that are directly addressed by 
the TENSOR technologies amount globally to approximately 100B 
USD and one million jobs with conservative estimates. Supporting the 
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development of TENSOR will result in a highly novel and competitive 
platform, and an accompanying ecosystem of companies (large ICT pro-
viders and SMEs that are part of the consortium, but also companies that 
are early adopters of the TENSOR technology). his will help European 
companies that are active in this market segment increase their market 
share and achieve higher growth rates. Accordingly, we foresee a propor-
tional increase in the number of jobs related to the TENSOR ecosystem 
(technology development, training, support, sales, etc.). For TENSOR to 
be able to afect 1% of the pertinent global market will mean to capture 
1 billion USD value and to create (or sustain) 10 thousand related jobs. 
Given the increasing trends of the market and the growing importance 
of the security sector, TENSOR is on track to deliver a signiicant and 
sustainable impact on the European economy.
6. CONCLUSIONS
he internet provides a haven for the creation, sharing, and access to 
terrorism-related content. It can be a breeding ground for radicalisation 
and violent extremism, and is one that is largely going unchecked due 
to the diiculties LEAs have in accessing, analysing and then managing 
such large amounts of information. he TENSOR platform will, through 
eicient data capture, text and multimedia processing, analysis and 
visualisation of such terrorist content, be able to reduce the workload on 
intelligence analysts and provide operational beneits in the linking of 
intelligence extracted from such content. TENSOR will serve the opera-
tional requirements of LEAs today and in the future by utilising state-of-
the-art technologies and algorithms, and by collaborating closely with a 
number of LEAs that operate on the frontline of Europe’s efort to coun-
ter the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.
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ABBREVIATIONS 
CoA: Course of Action
CNNs: Convolutional Neural Networks 
CPU: Central processing unit
DPA: Data Protection Act 
DSA: Digital Signature Algorithm 
FCA: Formal Concept Analysis 
HSMs: Hidden Service Marketplaces  
HTTPS: Interfaces over secure hypertext transfer protocol 
HUMINT: Human Intelligence - Agent handling
IP2: Invisible Internet Project
LEAs: Law Enforcement Agencies
MEB: Mapping Entropy Betweenness 
NLG: Natural Language Generation
OSINT: Open Source Intelligence  
REST: Representational state transfer
RIPA: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
RNNs: Recurrent Neural Networks 
SHA: Secure Hashing Algorithm 
SIGINT: Signals intelligence
SOA: Service-Oriented Architecture 
TLS: Transport Layer Security  
TOR: he Onion Router
UUIDs: Universally Unique Identiiers 
WORM: Write-once read-many 
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